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Abstract— In this paper we propose a reputation management
framework for large-scale peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, wherein all
nodes are assumed to behave selfishly. The proposed framework
has several advantages. It enables a form of virtual currency, such
that the reputation of nodes is a measure of their wealth. The
framework is scalable and provides protection against attacks by
malicious nodes. The above features are achieved by developing
trusted communities of nodes whose members trust each other
and cooperate to deal with the problem of nodes’ selfishness and
possible maliciousness.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we propose a reputation management framework
for large-scale peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, wherein all nodes
are assumed to behave selfishly. By selfish we mean that nodes
aim to maximize their own reputation in relation to others in
the network. The proposed framework has several advantages.
It enables a form of virtual currency, such that the reputation
of nodes is a measure of their wealth. The framework is
scalable and provides protection against attacks by malicious
nodes. The above features are achieved by developing trusted
communities of nodes whose members trust each other and
cooperate to deal with the problem of nodes’ selfishness and
possible maliciousness.
The concept of currency can be used for designing network
operation protocols for various distributed systems [11]. Such
systems require giving incentive or payoffs to nodes in order
to make them cooperate. Adopting a similar approach, several
incentive-based protocols exist that reward nodes in the form
of increased credit or currency for their cooperation in sharing
resources. In all of these currency or ”money” is used as a
standard tool to achieve the desired network goals. However,
a limitation of such schemes is that they either assume the
existence of an infrastructure for electronic currency or some
trusted centralized entity that maintains the debit/credit values
of the nodes. These assumptions can be difficult to enforce in
P2P networks.
However, reputation can be used as a basis to provide and
procure services. These services can range from sharing data,
such as audio/video files, to providing complex distributed
processing capabilities as in SETI@Home. In such on-line
economies, service providers are suitably compensated for the
The research reported in this paper is funded in part by Jerry R. Junkins
Chair position at Iowa State University.
resources/services they provide. The service providers are will-
ing to serve nodes with higher reputation to increase their own
reputation. The earned reputation in turn makes it easier for
them to obtain services in future. Thus, the objective of nodes
is to maximize their reputation as viewed by everybody else in
the system.
In order to be useful as a substitute for actual currency, we
identify the following minimum guarantees that a reputation
management framework needs to provide. It should be easier
for nodes with higher reputation to access network services.
When two nodes contend for a service and only one of them
can be served, a node with higher reputation should be serviced
and for this to happen the service provider should have incentive
to serve the more reputed node. Our framework provides this by
ensuring that the reputation of a node increases more by serving
a higher reputation node. This is in contrast with traditional
reputation schemes, where service providers make no distinction
between the type of nodes (whether of low or high reputation)
being served. Moreover, like real currency it must be possible
for nodes to protect their reputation against attacks by malicious
nodes. Furthermore, malicious nodes either individually or in
collusion should not be able to falsely increase their reputation.
However, there are important distinctions between real cur-
rency and using reputation as a substitute. Real currency can
precisely be measured. But reputation is an estimation and
different nodes may assign different reputation to a node.
Therefore, valuation error is inherent in systems using reputation
as a measure of nodes’ wealth. Moreover, unlike real cur-
rency, reputation gets depleted through expiration and malicious
behavior, and so one needs to constantly provide service in
order to maintain high reputation. Furthermore, reputation is not
necessarily spent or reduced when acquiring service(s), which
is not true if real currency is used.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II is on related
work. Section III presents the system model. In Section IV,
we introduce the notion of trust groups. Section V explains the
proposed reputation management framework in detail, which is
evaluated through simulation results in Section VI. We conclude
the paper in Section VII.
II. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK
In past several reputation management systems ([3], [4], [5],
[6], [9], [10], [7]) have been proposed specifically for P2P
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systems. Almost all the proposed schemes assume that majority
of the nodes truthfully follow a given protocol, so as to identify
the malicious nodes in the system. However, this assumption
does not hold true when we use reputation as a substitute
for currency. This is because everyone now has incentive to
behave in a manner so as to maximize their own and minimize
others’ reputation. Some examples of such a behavior include
the following - limiting the amount of positive information
regarding others, propagating false information about others’
behavior, giving poor recommendations etc. A framework for
reputation management for such systems should therefore ex-
plicitly take into account nodes’ selfishness, and assume that
nodes would follow a given protocol only if it maximizes
their own reputation. Besides enabling use of reputation as
currency, our proposed framework has several other desirable
characteristics as outlined below.
Reputation management schemes, such as [6], [8], do not
scale well to large systems. This is because they assume global
knowledge and require nodes to store information about every
other node in the system. This can be very difficult to implement
in large systems.
The reputation ratings generated by our framework identifies
the degree of trustworthiness of nodes. Proposals such as [9]
and [12] consider two and four, respectively, different possible
trust levels. This coarse granularity makes it difficult to reason
about trust explicitly as it cannot differentiate between nodes
with the same trust level even though they provide different
levels of services. Also, the relative reputation rating system of
[6] makes it difficult to distinguish good nodes from bad.
The authors in [7] develops a trust and security architecture
for a routing and node location service that uses a trust protocol,
which describes how honest nodes perform. On the other hand,
the reputation management framework presented in the paper
is not just limited to enable cooperative routing, but instead
is generalized enough to be used irrespective of the nature of
services being traded in the network.
The NICE system [10] aims to identify rather than enforce
the existence of cooperative peers. It claims to efficiently locate
the generous minority of cooperating peers and form a clique
of users all of whom offer local services to the community. The
system takes a novel approach, rather than using economics to
model trust, it proposes using trust to model expected service
prices.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a P2P network where nodes’ wealth is measured
by their reputation. Nodes are selfish in the sense that their
goal is to obtain desired services and maximize their reputation
relative to others. Both the service providers and receivers
benefit by obtaining accurate trustworthiness assessment of each
other. Service providers want to serve highly reputable clients
in order to maximize their own reputation and service receivers
want to maximize the quality of service they receive. The
service can be as simple as forwarding a routing message or
as complex as downloading data, sending a task for remote
execution etc. For concreteness, in the remainder of the paper
we use file sharing as the example of service being provided in
the network.
Each node has a specific area of interest and provide services
related to that interest category. For example, downloading
and caching of certain data types, such as audio/video files
belonging to a certain music group or artist. We assume that a
node supports at most one service category. Service categories
are denoted by   	
 
  , where n is the number
of different services provided. The network incurs a cost equal
to  for completing service   . This cost is a well-known
value and is due to network bandwidth consumed, buffer space
occupied etc. For simplicity,  is assumed to be constant for
all services and/or location of service providers and receivers
in the network.
We assume that each node has a unique public-private key
pair, and there is a mechanism to reliably obtain a node’s public
key given its IP address.
There may be malicious or bad nodes, which provide bad
service and/or aim to disrupt the normal operations of a
network. Example of malicious activities include spreading
viruses, propagating wrong information regarding others etc.
Non-malicious or good nodes, although selfish, do not provide
bad service or try to disrupt the operations of a network. Good
nodes are differentiated based on the probability (called service
probability) with which they provide service, if selected by a
client. All nodes either belong to a set of good nodes (Good)
or bad nodes (Bad). The total number of nodes are denoted by
N (=   ! "$#% ).
A node i maintains three sets % , "&#'' , and ( , which
are the set of good, bad, and unknown nodes, respectively, as
perceived by it. ( represents the set of nodes about whom
there is insufficient (or no) information, which allows them to be
classified as either good or bad. Initially all the nodes are put in
( . With time, as more experience is gained about these nodes,
their reputation ratings are updated and if appropriate they are
moved to either   or "$#%  . For each positive (negative)
information that a node receives, it increases (decreases) the
reputation of the service provider based on the reputation of
the service receiver.
Nodes form trusted communities whose members trust each
other to be good nodes and rely on each other for protection
from malicious nodes. Such communities are called trust groups
(TGrps). The members of a TGrp share the same reputation as
viewed by the outside nodes. For example, if the reputation of
a TGrp with S number of nodes is R, then the reputation of
an individual member node is )*+  . We assume that each node
belongs to at most one TGrp. TGrp members are also referred
to as peers. TGrp of a node x is denoted by ,.-/1032 and the
same notation is used to denote the set of nodes that comprise
a TGrp. Thus, ,.-/1032 is a set of nodes consisting of x and its
peers. If two nodes x and y are members of the same TGrp,
then we say ,4-/1032576%-/1032 .
Reputation of a node is a decaying function of time, i.e. nodes
need to continuously share resources and provide services.
A node’s reputation is incremented only if it serve someone
outside its TGrp.1 If this is not the case then malicious nodes
can easily collude and increase their reputation by only serving
1As we would see in Section V-B, when a node serves someone in its TGrp,
only the peers increase the serving node’s reputation.
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each other. The reputation of a node is updated after each service
transaction and is represented as follows.
)  	
  







is a function that takes as input the reputation of a
service provider ( )   	




outputs an updated reputation value for the service provider
( )  
  
 ). The output value is directly proportional to the
reputation of the service receiver. Thus, nodes have incentive to
serve reputable good nodes. The above expression holds true
for updating a TGrp reputation also, i.e. if node x serves node
y, the reputation of xTGrp is increased in accordance with the
reputation of yTGrp.
A. Service Information Propagation
If a node provides good service then only the network
neighbors and TGrp members of the concerned nodes (i.e. the
service provider and receiver) become aware of the service
transaction. This is because selfish nodes do not propagate
positive information in order to prevent others from increasing
their reputation. On the other hand, negative information is
readily propagated to lower the reputation of the affected nodes.
We assume that before a client receives service, it provides
information on its neighbors and TGrp members to the service
provider. At the end of a successful service completion, the
client signs a satisfaction certificate (a form of digital certificate)
and gives it to the server. The satisfaction certificate is a proof
that the server provided good service to the client. The server
on receiving the satisfaction certificate sends it to the nodes
known to it. These nodes (except the peers), however, do not
have incentive to further pass on this positive information.
On the other hand, if a server provides bad service, then
that information is readily propagated, first by a client to the
nodes known to it and then recursively to other nodes known
to each of them. As a result, negative information is known to
a large fraction of the total nodes and its propagation can be
assumed to follow a flooding mechanism. Although, it is not
straightforward for a node that received bad service to prove
that fact, it can still send a complaint against the server. The
complaint message contains digitally signed information about
the service provider from which bad service was received. Since,
complaints can be easily (even falsely) initiated, it is difficult for
the receiving nodes to ascertain the validity of such messages,
and consequently reputation of both the nodes (complainant and
complainer) is reduced. The decrease in each node’s reputation
is in proportion to the other node’s reputation. This works as a
disincentive for selfish good nodes to falsely propagate negative
information. Still, sending a complaint against a malicious node
would not significantly affect a good node, as malicious nodes
typically have low (zero or negative) reputation.
IV. TRUST GROUPS
A. Advantages of TGrps
 Members of a TGrp cooperate to minimize the damage
that malicious nodes can cause to their reputation. This
is because a node’s reputation is derived from its TGrp’s
reputation, which in turn is dependent on the aggregate
service provided by all the member nodes. Thus, even
if malicious nodes target a good node by sending false
complaints against it, the reputation of the target node is
not severely affected. TGrp members assist in positive information propagation,
i.e. when a member node provides good service, its peers
help to propagate that information to as many other nodes
as possible. TGrps provide scalability to the reputation management
system because nodes are judged based on their TGrps.
Therefore, one needs to keep reputation information about
TGrps only, which are much less in number than the total
number of nodes in a network.
 Recommendations from peers are more reliable. This is
because peers have different areas of interest (and thus
minimum conflict of interest), and so have little incentive
to provide misleading recommendations.
B. TGrp Management
In this section, we briefly discuss how nodes are added
and deleted from a TGrp. The most important requirement for
selecting peers and forming a TGrp is that the constituting
members trust each other to be good nodes. This is because the
reputation of a node is determined by the reputation of its TGrp,
which in turn depends on the aggregate service provided by all
the member nodes. Thus, new members are carefully screened
before admitting them to a TGrp. Likewise, new nodes carefully
select which TGrp (if any) they should join.
A node is added to a TGrp if it is not in set, "$#%% , of any
of the existing member nodes, and its reputation is greater than
that of any of the existing TGrp members as viewed by some
member node. Another important criterion for forming a TGrp
is to ensure that nodes have no (or minimum) conflict of interest
among themselves. Conflict of interest arises if a node suffers
a potential loss by increasing the reputation of one of its peers.
This can happen, for example, if two peers having same area
of interest contend for the same resource. If the resource can
be awarded to only one of them, then it is in each node’s
best interest to not cooperate and in fact lower each other’s
reputation. Therefore, we assume that TGrp members belong to
different service categories.
Now we look at the reverse process, i.e. how nodes leave or
are forced out of a TGrp. It is generally difficult for a malicious
node to join a TGrp. A stringent screening function is applied
by the member nodes before admitting a new node into their
TGrp. Still, it is possible for malicious nodes to join TGrps
by providing good service early on till they get admitted. On
joining a TGrp they can then provide bad service and/or send
false negative information about good nodes. Therefore, it is
important to identify and remove such nodes from a TGrp. This
removal process is also termed as eviction.
A member node is evicted only if it provides bad service
several times, and its reputation goes below zero as viewed by
the majority of its TGrp members. This is because peers trust
and give each other benefit of doubt even if complaints are
received regarding each other. Several external factors can cause
nodes to provide bad service, like broken ISP connection, net-
work congestion, unintended virus uploads etc. A member node
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might also possibly be a victim of false negative information
propagated against it by malicious nodes. Thus, member nodes
are given a lot of leeway before being evicted from a TGrp.
Evicted nodes are put in "$#%  by all the peer nodes. In
addition, a node’s eviction is made known to as many other
nodes as possible. Since eviction signals negative information
about a node, propagation of this information follows the same
rule as that for normal complaints.
C. Trust Group Membership Validation
It is important for nodes to be able to correctly prove their
credentials regarding their TGrps. Moreover, malicious nodes
should not be able to fake their membership to some highly
reputable TGrp. Furthermore, as nodes join and leave a TGrp,
it should be possible to seamlessly update TGrp membership
information.
TGrp members create an affiliation certificate that include
the IP addresses of all the nodes that comprise the TGrp and
successively encrypted by each node’s private key. For example,
say nodes 1, 2, and 3 form a TGrp. The IP addresses and private
keys of nodes are represented by    and / , respectively
( 	 
   ). The following is the affiliation certificate for
this TGrp:                 . One can obtain the
public keys of 1, 2, and 3 and verify that they all belong to the
same TGrp. The affiliation certificate also contains a time stamp
such that old certificates cannot be used by (evicted) nodes to
falsely claim membership to a TGrp.
A node in order to prove its membership to a TGrp can
include the affiliation certificate (containing its IP address as
well as that of the TGrp members) when communicating with
other nodes. Other nodes on receiving the affiliation certificate
can update (if they do not already have) their information about
the TGrp. When a TGrp member is evicted, the remaining
member nodes create a new affiliation certificate and include
it in their message for propagating the information that a node
has been evicted. This enables TGrp membership information to
be updated by a large fraction of the nodes that receive the new
affiliation certificate. Likewise, when a new node joins a TGrp,
the updated affiliation certificate includes information about the
new node.
It is assumed that joins and leaves from a TGrp occur one
node at a time, and that the reputation (and also the reputation
counter value) of the old TGrp is inherited by the new TGrp.
More elaborate mechanisms are needed to handle scenarios
involving concurrent joins and leaves. For example, the case
when a TGrp disintegrates into multiple TGrps each consisting
of a large subset of the original set of member nodes and/or
when multiple TGrps fuse into a single TGrp. The study of
such mechanisms are part of our future work.
V. REPUTATION MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Owing to the difficulties caused by nodes’ selfishness, we
define the following goals for our reputation management
framework. With high probability, nodes with higher reputation
should get better services, i.e. nodes which provide good service
should get good service in return. Moreover, malicious nodes
should not be able to fake high reputation and lower the
reputation of good nodes in any significant manner, i.e. good
nodes should be regarded as good and bad nodes as bad by all
good nodes in a system. The chances of a node being identified
correctly is directly proportional to how good or bad it is, i.e.
its service probability. These goals are summarized below.
  "&#%   , i.e. good nodes should not be
viewed as bad by other good nodes. "&#'   7 , i.e. bad nodes should not be
viewed as good by good nodes.    
"$#% "&#'  5 , i.e. good nodes
should be viewed as good and bad nodes should be viewed
as bad only by good nodes.
It must be noted that these goals cannot be perfectly achieved
in a large and dynamic P2P system with imprecise information.
Therefore, the proposed framework strives to achieve these
goals with high probability only. In our discussion, all services
are considered at par with each other. Thus, the reputation of
a service provider depend on the clients it serve and not on
the category of service it provides. Similarly, all bad services
are indistinguishable from each other, i.e. the reputation of a
service provider is reduced based on the reputation of a client
that sends a complaint against it.
A. Reputation Representation and Calculation
A node computes the reputation of every other TGrp that it is
aware of. Since the reputation of a node is simply the reputation
of its TGrp divided by the number of nodes in that TGrp,
we only describe how the reputation of a TGrp is estimated.
Nodes that are not part of any TGrp are also considered as
TGrps comprising of a single member node. In addition to
maintaining the reputation of other TGrps, a node also maintains
the reputation of its peers. This is important so as to determine
when to add a new member or to remove an (possibly malicious)
existing one from the TGrp.
Since the information available at nodes vary, nodes may have
different views or reputation of the same TGrp. The consistency
in views is proportional to the service probabilities of the
member nodes of the target TGrp. A very active TGrp whose
member nodes provide service often, is considered good by a
large fraction of the nodes. Whereas, a TGrp whose member
nodes provide service infrequently, is viewed as good by only
a few and unknown by a large fraction of the nodes. Thus,
reputation of a TGrp and service probabilities of its members
are directly related to each other.
The reputation of a TGrp is always a value between -1 and 1.
Higher value corresponds to higher reputation, and vice versa.
More precisely, good nodes have positive reputation ratings and
bad nodes have negative ratings, and value zero is assigned to
nodes in set ( . The reputation value is updated after every time
period  , which is a well-defined system parameter.  can be
either timer-driven or event-driven, for example, based on the
number of requests observed by a node. A TGrp’s reputation
is dependent on two factors - number of times its members
provided service (and to whom) out of the total service instances
in the current time period, and its reputation at the end of the
last time period. For illustration, we consider an observer node
o and see how it updates its reputation of other TGrps (and also
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its peers). Before that we define some definitions that are useful
in our subsequent discussion.
Definition 1: Network neighbors of o denoted by    , are the
set of neighboring nodes as governed by the overlay routing
substrate. The neighboring nodes are utilized for carrying out
resource lookups.
Definition 2: Network view of o, represented by  , is the set
of all nodes that o is aware of. This set will include, o’s own ID,
its network neighbors, its TGrp members, and other nodes that it
becomes aware of on receiving messages containing satisfaction
certificates and complaints. For simplicity, we assume that the
size of this set can only grow as o learns about new nodes. In a
dynamic system, it is possible for both network neighbors and
TGrp members to change. However, as long as these nodes are
still part of the network, it is useful to include them in one’s
network view so as to be able to send satisfaction certificates
to them in future.
For each TGrp, o maintains a reputation counter      ,
3  -/1032  .   	
   is initialized to zero at the start
of every time interval. The counter is increased (decreased)
whenever a member of  - 10
2 provides good (bad) service.
Since one gets higher reward for serving more reputable nodes,
the increase (decrease) in the counter value is proportional to the
reputation of the node being served (cheated). More precisely,
if i serves j, where 3   and  -/1032 -/1032 , o updates
iTGrp’s reputation counter as follows.
  	
    	    	
     
  '*  +- 10
2  (2)
At the same time jTGrp’s counter is decreased by   , which
is the cost that the network incurs due to the service transaction
and is charged to jTGrp. Therefore, we have,
 
   ! 
     (3)
If i cheats j, the counters for both iTGrp and jTGrp are
decremented as follows.
    !  
     
   *4  -/1032 
 
   ! 
        *   -/1032  (4)
For example, say there are three nodes a, b and c in   ,
that belong to TGrps aTGrp, bTGrp, and cTGrp, respectively.
Let the cardinality of all the three TGrps be one. The counter
values  
   3    , and  
   are initially set to zero.
o first receives a satisfaction certificate stating that a provided
service to b. As a result,     is updated to contain value
1. Subsequently, if c provides service to a then using Equation
2,  
   is updated to value 2 (=1+1). Now, if b is a bad
node and sends a complaint against c, 
   is reduced to -2,
but  
   remains unchanged. After these three messages, a
and c are put in   , and b in "$#%  , respectively. In other
words, o views a and c as good, and b as a bad node.
As can be seen, if o receives a complaint message that i
cheated j, it decrements the reputation counters for both iTGrp
and jTGrp. This is because complaints can be falsely initiated
and it is difficult for o to ascertain their validity. However,
it is known for sure that one of i or j acted maliciously
and therefore the counters for both the TGrps are reduced in
proportion to the others’ current value. This simple rule ensures
that malicious nodes suffer more (incur a larger reduction in
counter values) than non-malicious nodes. This is because non-
malicious or good nodes provide service to others and typically
have higher counter values. This also prevent good nodes from
falsely propagating negative information against other (good)
nodes. Here we assume that of the two nodes indicated in any
complaint, one belongs to  and the other to "&#' .
At the end of the current time interval, o calculates the
reputation of all the TGrps in  using the following equation.
)            
  !  
     -/1032"#  (5)
The denominator in Equation 5 represents the sum of counter
values of all the TGrps that o is aware of. The reputation
( )   	
   ) of TGrp, iTGrp, obtained above for the current time
interval is combined with the TGrp’s reputation at the end of
the previous interval (represented by )  
    ) to obtain its new
reputation value ( )     ) as shown below.
)     %$'& )   
     	  $ (& )  
 
   (6)
Here, $ is the importance given to the current performance
of a TGrp as opposed to its past performance for estimating its
reputation. In general, when it is not important (or is implied)
to specify the observer node (here o), the reputation of iTGrp
is simply written as )1	
   . The reputation of any node, i,
represented by )   , is given as )1	
  '*  )   4 . Again, when
it is not important (or is implied) to specify the observer node,
the reputation of i is simply written as )  .
At the end of every time interval, nodes with reputation values
below zero are put in "$#%  . In other words, if a TGrp has a
reputation value of less than zero, then all the member nodes
are considered as malicious and put in "$#%  .
In the above, we have shown how the reputation of different
TGrps (including one’s own) is calculated by o. In addition, o
calculates the reputation of each of its peers by maintaining a
counter    for each of them, 3   	-/1032 . These counters are
handled similarly to those for the TGrps; their exact updation
mechanism is given in the next section. Peer reputation values
are given by the following equations, which are analogous to
the ones used above for TGrps’ reputation calculation.
)        
  !  
   (7)
)   )$*& )      	  $ +& )  
  (8)
B. Reputation Counter Updation Algorithm
The algorithm presented here is used by good nodes to update
the reputation counters for different TGrps as well as their peers;
the reputation values based on these counters are calculated at
the end of every time period of length  as explained in Section
V-A. As before   , "$#%  , and ( represent the set of good,
bad, and unknown nodes, respectively, as viewed by an observer
node o.
The underlying principle of the algorithm is that a TGrp’s
reputation is dependent on the reputation of the TGrp(s) it has
served (or cheated). Also, reputation ratings are increased by
non-TGrp members only if the service provider and receiver
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belong to different TGrps. We divide the algorithm into two
categories - for dealing with positive and negative information,
respectively.2
Category 1: Node o receives a message (    ) that a provided
service to b. Note that this message is originated by a and
contains the satisfaction certificate given to it by b. We use the
following notation to describe this event,  # . Based on
this information, node o takes an appropriate action as outlined
in Figure 1.
1) if 	
	 !  "
2) then
3) return;
4) if 	    !#
5) then
6) $%!&('*)%+,$%-&.+/$ !0
7) $ 0 '1$ !032 $54
8) return;
9) if 	   !#
10) then
11) $%-&('*)%+6$%-&7+/$ !098;:<>=@?BA ! A
12) $ !0C8":<>= '1$ !098;:<>=(2 $54
13) send D &E0 to FHG>I"F3
J 
14) return;
15) if 	K!  !L M!#
16) then
17) $%-&E8":#<>='N)O+6$%-&E8;:<>=.+/$ !0
18) $ !0 '1$ !0P2 $54
19) return;
20) if 	K!L !L M!#
21) then
22) $%-&E8":#<>='N)O+6$%-&E8;:<>=.+/$ !098;:<>= ?BA ! A
23) $ !0C8":<>= '1$ !098;:<>=(2 $54
24) return;
Fig. 1. Reputation counter updation upon receiving a satisfaction certificate
Category 2: Node o receives a message (     ) that a cheated
b. Note that this message is originated and signed by b. We
use the following notation to describe this event, Q #SRT .
Based on this information, node o takes an appropriate action
as outlined in Figure 2.
Figure 1 is self-explanatory, so we focus on Figure 2. U #V "W
(where XZY[WSY\V]Y\U[Y 	 ) limit the reduction in reputation
counter values for one’s TGrp members. Peers are given benefit
of doubt even if bad service is received from them. This
is because nodes trust their TGrp members to be good and
attribute their malicious behavior to some external factor as was
described in Section IV-B. For example, in Steps 3 and 4, o
minimizes the reduction in reputation counter of its peer node
by a factor, U (which is less than 1). Likewise, if a member node
receives a complaint involving two of its peers, the reputation
counters for both are reduced, but scaled down by a factor, V ,
as shown in Step 2. The value of V is typically less than U
because it is not known for certain which of the two nodes
is really a malicious node. Thus, a low value of V minimizes
wrongfully penalizing a good peer node. Moreover, there is a
possibility that none of the two nodes are malicious and poor
2In the reputation counter updation mechanism presented in Figures 1 and
case2, if a counter value on the right-hand side of an assignment statement is





4) if 	(!    !(!##`	a b#`	a B
5) then
6) $ -& 'c$ -& 2 $ !0edPf
7) $ !0 '1$ !0P2 $ -& dOf
8) return;
8) if 	(!    !(!##`	  b
9) then
10) $ -& 'c$ !& 2 $ !0gdOh
11) return;
12)if 	K!  (!  !##`	  B
13)then
14) $ !0 'c$ !032 $%-& d%h
15) return;
16)if 	K!  (!L !#
17)then
18) $ -& 'c$ !& 2 C$ !0C8":<>=@?BA !(! A  dPi
19) $ !0C8":<>= '1$ !098;:<>=(2 $ -&
20) return;
21)if 	K!  !Z !#
22)then
23) $ !0 'c$ !032 C$ -&E8":#<j= ?A ! A  dOi
24) $ -&E8":#<>= 'c$ -&E8":#<j= 2 $ !0
25) return;
26)if 	K!L (!L !#
27)then
28) $ !0C8":<>= '1$ !098;:<>=(2 $ -&E8":#<>= ?A M! A
29) $ -&E8":#<>= 'c$ -&E8":#<j= 2 $ !0C8":#<j=@?A ! A
30) send D &E0 to F-GjI;FP
^Jk
31) return;
32)if 	K!L (!  !#
33)then
34) return; /* do nothing - both a and b belong to the
same TGrp. Not much can be derived from this information
*/
Fig. 2. Reputation counter updation upon receiving a complaint
service occurred because of some external factor. The value W
in Steps 5 and 6 represents the fact that nodes trust their peers
more than they trust someone outside their TGrp. Thus, a low
value of W makes it difficult for bad nodes to cause a node to be
evicted from a TGrp by propagating false negative information
against it.
VI. FRAMEWORK EVALUATION
We have evaluated our proposed reputation management
framework using extensive simulations and found that it satisfies
the requirements for using reputation as a form of currency, and
is robust against possible attacks by malicious nodes. Simulation
results show that reputation and extent of awareness about
TGrps is directly proportional to the service probabilities of
their respective member nodes. Moreover, with time all bad
nodes are detected and isolated, thus limiting the amount of
bad service they can provide to good nodes.
A. Simulation Setup
The network contains a specified number of good and bad
nodes. Good nodes are differentiated based on their service












DEFAULT VALUES OF THE PARAMETERS USED IN SIMULATIONS.
transaction. The goal of bad nodes is to maximize the instances
of bad service in the network, i.e. their intent is to get selected
for a transaction and then provide bad service. Moreover, they
may fake high reputation to increase their priority and prevent
legitimate requests from being serviced. Furthermore, bad nodes
may propagate false negative information against a target node
to reduce its reputation and cause it to be evicted from its TGrp.
Evicted nodes are considered as bad and are given a very low
reputation value (say -1) by the peers and others that learn about
the node being evicted. We refer to such attacks as the denial-
of-reputation (DoR) attacks and the only way a good node’s
reputation can appreciably be decreased is by causing it to be
evicted from its TGrp.
In our simulations, we do not penalize nodes for accessing
services, i.e.  in Equation 3 is set to zero and a node’s
reputation is unaffected if it accesses service. This is based on
the assumption that serving a request is much more expensive
than receiving a request and an overloaded node can simply
ignore a request if it is unable to serve it.
Nodes have fixed number of network neighbors equal to
O(log N), where N is the network size.3 All good nodes belong
to one of the specified service categories, i.e. they originate
and serve requests only related to that service category. The
total number of service categories is dependent on the network
size and in all simulations it is set to N/15. We also ran
simulations with the number of service categories equal to N/10
and obtained similar results as presented here. Good nodes
configure themselves into various TGrps and no two member
nodes in a TGrp belong to the same service category. Bad nodes
can also join TGrps in order to subsequently provide bad service
and/or target good nodes.
To keep our framework general and independent of any
specific routing protocol, we assume that all nodes belonging to
a requested service category are equally likely to be selected by
a client. The probability of selection is governed by the service
probabilities (i.e. reputation) of the candidate nodes. Moreover,
bad nodes can intercept requests and claim to provide service,
even if they are not capable of doing so. The probability of
interception is directly proportional to the number of bad nodes.
Unless otherwise stated, Table I gives the value of various
parameters used in our simulations. We divide the total sim-
ulation time into multiple simulation rounds. In every round,
each node initiates a single request that can be satisfied by any
of the potential service providers. The limit of one request per
node per simulation round simplifies the handling of scenarios
3This is typically the neighborhood size in several proposed P2P architecture,
such as Chord [1] and CAN [2].
where bad nodes repeatedly send out messages to enhance each
others’ reputation. Intuitively, if one receives multiple service
transaction information initiated by the same node in a short
span of time, then this information is discarded.
The time interval for reputation updation, as defined in
Section V-A, is equal to one simulation round. This was adopted
so as to simplify the simulation code and any other timer value
could also be used without altering the qualitative nature of the
results.
In our simulations, since we want to evaluate the effectiveness
of TGrps and not worry about how they are formed, we assume
the TGrps as given with all the good nodes belonging to one of
them. Initially, the bad nodes are not part of any TGrp, however,
they can join one if they provide sufficiently good service over
a period of time. This scenario is valid in real-world also, as
malicious nodes usually do not join a network in the early stages
of its formation. Usually it is much easier for malicious nodes
to operate when the network has reached a certain critical size.
Now we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed frame-
work in identifying and isolating malicious nodes, and in
minimizing the instances of bad service in the network.
B. Attack Models
To take into account different possible strategies of the bad
nodes, we examine several attack models in this section. These
attack models reflect the main requirements outlined in Section
I for using reputation as a substitute for currency, and also
indicate the robustness of the proposed framework in dealing
with nodes’ selfishness and maliciousness.
Fig. 3. Even when there are large number of malicious nodes in the system, the
percentage of bad service in the network continuously decrease as the number
of requests increase. Bad nodes are identified and not selected for future service
transactions. The simulation results are for a network with 300 good nodes, with
increasingly higher number of bad nodes. For example, (300, 50) denotes the
network configuration with 300 good nodes and 50 bad nodes.
1) Attack Model A.: Malicious nodes always provide bad
service when selected for a transaction. The probability of a
bad node selection is directly proportional to the number of
bad nodes in the system: In this case, the reputation ratings of
bad nodes remain very low and thus they are not able to join
any TGrp. Since negative information is readily propagated, all
bad nodes are rapidly identified and put in "$#%  set by all
the good nodes. Since the nodes in "&#%  are not selected for
service transaction, the affect of bad nodes on good nodes is
minimized and the network soon continues to operate as if there
are no malicious nodes.
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As shown in Figure 3, the number of bad service instances
saturate to some maximum value after only a few simulation
rounds. As expected, the time to reach this maximum value is





































































bad−service : instances of bad service provided by a bad node
good−service : instances of good service provided by a bad node
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Fig. 4. With increasing

, the amount of good service provided by a malicious
node to join a TGrp exceeds the amount of bad service it can provide before
it is evicted from a TGrp. Network size refers to the total number of nodes in
the system.
2) Attack Model B.: Malicious nodes first provide good
service (with service probability equal to unity) and try to join
some TGrp(s). Upon joining a TGrp, they always provide bad
service: The intent of bad nodes here is to utilize the fact that
the reputation of a node is dependent on the reputation of its
TGrp. By joining reputable TGrps, malicious nodes attempt to
maximize the instances of bad service in the network. This is
because bad nodes are not put in "&#%% , as long as good service
by their peers offset their bad service. As a result, bad nodes
despite their poor service record continue to get selected for
service transactions.
As described in Section IV-B, the reputation of a member
node that provide bad service is gradually reduced and is even-
tually evicted when its reputation goes below zero as viewed
by the majority of its peers. Moreover, re-entry of an evicted
node into the same or any other TGrp requires higher level of
service than what was required of it previously. Therefore, we
only consider the damage that a bad node can cause by joining
a TGrp for the first time.
We ran simulations to see the total number of bad service
instances that a malicious node can provide upon entering a
TGrp and before it is evicted. As shown in Figure 4, the amount
of bad service that a malicious node can provide, before it is
evicted, is greatly influenced by the value of $ . For small values
of $ , the number of bad service instances far exceed the number
of good service instances. But as $ is increased, the reverse is
true and this attack model becomes less and less attractive for
the bad nodes.4 These results are as expected, since higher $
means that greater importance is given to current as compared
to past performance. Therefore, malicious nodes cannot rely on
past reputation to continue providing bad service and still be
part of a TGrp.
We believe that it is difficult to completely avoid the damage
caused by this attack model. This is due to the premise on which
the notion of TGrps is based. TGrp members trust each other
to be good and give each other benefit of doubt even if they
provide bad service. However, in all our simulation runs, bad
nodes are eventually identified and evicted.
4Bad nodes need to provide good service to be able to join a TGrp.
3) Attack Model C.: Malicious nodes launch DoR attacks to
reduce the target nodes’ reputation and cause them to be evicted
from their TGrps: Although these attacks can be successful, it
requires several bad nodes to provide sufficient good service to
cause a target good node to be evicted. This partly defeats the
goal of malicious nodes to maximize the instances of bad service
in the network. We ran simulations with network size equal to
150, 300, and 450 and in each configuration successively varied
the number of bad nodes. All the bad nodes target a randomly
chosen good node and spread false negative information against
it in each round. Also, in order to earn high reputation, bad
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240 276 313 330 374 470 490
263 298 314 322 377 384
298 323 361 375 403 459
34 27 25 23 22 22 22
32 31 29 27 25 24
38 37 29 28 28 27
round # : Simulation round number in which the target node is evicted
good−service : instances of good service provided by bad nodes (till the target node is evicted)
in order to earn high reputation
Network size
Fig. 5. With the increase in the number of bad nodes, the target node is
evicted in an earlier round. At the same time, however, the total instances of
good service provided by bad nodes also increase. Entries left blank indicate that
bad nodes were unable to evict the target node, i.e. DoR attack failed. Network
size refers to the total number of nodes (    	  
  ) in the system.
As shown in Figure 5, in all the simulation runs, at least 20-
30 bad nodes were required to cause a target node to be evicted.
This is expected because peers of the target node scale down the
reputation counter values of the complaining nodes by a factor,
W (=0.1). Thus, large number of complaints are needed before
the reputation of the target node goes below zero as viewed by
its peers. With higher number of bad nodes the target node is
quickly evicted, i.e. in an earlier round, but the total instances
of good service provided by the bad nodes is also increased.
4) Attack Model D.: Bad nodes split themselves into two
groups - "&#' 	 and "$#% 
 . Nodes in "$#% 	 always provide
good service and nodes in "$#% 
 always provide bad service.
"$#% 	 nodes assist "$#%
 nodes to increase their reputation: This
attack model attempts to maximize the number of bad service
instances by increasing the probability that "$#%
 nodes are
selected for service transactions. "&#% 	 nodes initially provide
good service in order to be accepted into some TGrp. After
joining a TGrp, they do not serve good nodes and only propagate
positive information about "$#%
 nodes. Since "&#' 	 nodes
never provide bad service and because   is set to zero in our
simulations, "$#% 	 nodes never get evicted from their TGrp(s).
"$#% 
 nodes on the other hand use the increased reputation to
get selected for service transactions and provide bad service.
To evaluate the effectiveness of this attack model, we compare
it with attack model A to see if "&#' 	 and "$#% 
 nodes together
are able to increase the instances of bad services beyond what
is possible in attack model A. For this we define a metric, net
maliciousness, which is the difference between the number of
bad service instances provided by "$#% 
 nodes and good service
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Fig. 6. Comparison of attack models A and D when the number of good
nodes are 300 (i.e.       ) and the number of 
  nodes are 100
(   
   	
 ). The number of 
    nodes vary from 0 to 100 in attack
model D, whereas they remain equal to 0 in attack model A.
instances provided by "$#% 	 nodes.
It is clear from the results in Figure 6 that the value of net
maliciousness in attack model D is less than that in attack model
A, even when there are significantly large number of "&#' 	
nodes. For experimentation, in attack model A, we always set
the number of "$#% 	 nodes to zero, while in attack model D,
we successively increase the number of "$#% 	 nodes to see how
it increases the probability of "$#%
 nodes getting selected for
service transactions. When the number of "&#% 	 nodes increase
relative to the number of good nodes, "&#% 	 nodes do not have to
provide as much good service to get accepted into some TGrp.
This explains higher net maliciousness achieved by attack model
D as compared to attack model A when  "&#' 	'	BX . Similar
results were obtained for other network sizes as well, and it
appears that this attack strategy is not any stronger than the one
adopted in attack model A.
30 50 70 90 110 130 15010
43 46 45 47 47 51 53 53
|Bad|
round #
Fig. 7. Illustration of the number of rounds in which the bad nodes are
identified as bad by the good nodes. The number of good nodes are 300 and
the number of bad nodes vary from 10 to 150. In every simulation round each
bad node sends a satisfaction certificate with another randomly selected bad
node as the service provider. The service probabilities of the bad nodes are set
to unity so as to simulate their increased reputation, and hence higher probability
of getting selected by good nodes for service transactions.
5) Attack Model E.: Malicious nodes send out false sat-
isfaction certificates, indicating other malicious nodes as the
service provider, in order to increase each other’s reputation.
In addition, they provide bad service when selected by good
nodes for service transactions.: Malicious nodes can use the
increased fake reputation to increase their priority and prevent
other legitimate requests from being serviced. However, this
attack strategy is naturally countered in our framework. An
increase in the reputation of malicious nodes attract service
requests from the good nodes. But since malicious nodes
provide bad service to good nodes their reputation goes down.
This decrease in reputation can be substantial depending on the
value of parameter W . In fact the simulation results confirmed
this hypothesis, as it was found that all the malicious nodes
were quickly identified as bad by the good nodes (see Figure
7). Interestingly, number of malicious nodes had little impact
on the effectiveness of this attack model. This is primarily due
to the limit imposed on the number of requests that a node can
originate in any given round.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The most important contribution of the paper is to utilize
the concept of TGrps for reputation management and use of
reputation as currency in large-scale P2P networks. We find that
even simple reputation updation rules, based on the notion of
TGrps, are effective when there are large number of malicious
nodes working in collusion to bring down the system.
Our model is easily extensible and flexible enough to be
tuned as per the requirements of a specific system. The pro-
posed framework is scalable to large P2P systems and enables
reputation computation in the face of nodes’ selfishness, which
can cause wrong or no service information to be propagated.
In future we would extend the proposed framework to handle
scenarios when nodes can simultaneously be part of multiple
TGrps.
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